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The Issue of Normativity and the Methodological 
Implications of Interpretivism II: 
The Distinctive Normativity of Law
Abstract. The article is the second part of an analysis that seeks to clarify the distinctive normativity of law, as it 
is refl ected in the legal systems of constitutional democracies. It explores the ability of interpretive theories to 
capture the conceptual characteristics of the normativity of law. The article argues that it is its institutional 
character that makes the normativity of law distinctive. The normativity of law must be construed as a form of 
institutional normativity. The analysis of the institutional character of legal norms revolves around the idea of 
obligations. It implies that the distinctive normativity of law builds on normative guidance by authoritative 
institutions. The ability of the law to provide normative guidance is explained in terms of three types of reasons: 
moral reasons, compliance reasons and response reasons. An implication of this insight is that moral legitimacy is 
constitutive of the normativity of law. The article concludes with an exploration of the dimensions of moral 
legitimacy in law, and the way the interplay of the justifi catory background to normative claims and the institutional 
features of law make false normativity in law possible.
Keywords: interpretivism, normative guidance, authority, institutional normativity, moral legitimacy, false 
normativity
In Part I of this article,1 I have sought to lay the conceptual groundwork for an interpretive account of the 
normativity of law. That article offered a methodological programme, a clarifi cation of the idea of normative 
guidance, and an analysis of normative claims in terms of practical reasons. In Part II, I seek to bring together the 
conceptual elements that have been elaborated there, and deploy them to provide an account of the distinctive 
normativity of law. I emphasise the fact that my main concern is testing the ability of interpretive legal theories to 
capture the conceptual characteristics of law. I explore the peculiarities, structures and limitations of interpretive 
theorising. Even when I give a different impression, this piece remains a predominantly methodological piece: the 
abstract demonstration of a methodological vision. 
1. The normativity of law
1.1. The prohibition of direct discrimination as a legal obligation 
It is useful to start with reminding ourselves of the original question that guided the analysis 
in Part I: what happens to a normative claim when it is written into the law? There, I chose 
the normative claim condemning direct discrimination (in the law of the United Kingdom) 
as the test case for my analysis.2 In Part I, I concentrated on the way the relevant normative 
claim can operate outside the context of law. In other words, I tested the capacity for 
normative guidance of the following claim: ‘treating people less favourably just because 
* Senior lecturer, University of Aberdeen, School of Law, Elphinstone Road, Aberdeen, AB24 
3UF, United Kingdom.United Kingdom.
E-mail: m.bodig@abdn.ac.uk
1 See Bódig, M.: The Issue of Normativity and the Methodological Implications of Interpretivism 
I: The Idea of Normative Guidance. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 54 (2013) 2, 119–139.
2  See Equality Act 2010, ss. 13(1) and 39.
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they are of a different colour or gender is wrong: if we truly respect the moral equality of 
persons, we must stand up against discrimination.’ Here, on the back of the analysis already 
provided, I look at the normative claim condemning direct discrimination as a legal norm. 
If we compare the moral claim to the corresponding legal norm we fi nd in Equality Act 
2010, it is not hard to spot a few conceptually relevant differences. The most obvious is that 
the legal norm is embedded in the practice of a system of institutions. Those institutions 
bolster the normative claim with an enforcement mechanism3 that had no equivalent before. 
Concentrating on this insight may seem to make our job of clarifi cation relatively 
straightforward. At the beginning of my analysis in Part I, I promised to address the 
conceptual implications of the claim that ‘law is a normative and institutional social 
practice.’ One could think that, in Part I, I have dealt extensively with what ‘normative’ 
may mean in that sentence, and we can turn now to another conceptual ingredient: the way 
the ‘institutional’ character of law determines its conceptual features. But, of course, it 
would be a mistake to think that we deal with two separate conceptual features here. 
Institutionalisation has a comprehensive impact on the way normative claims guide action. 
It alters the conditions of what I characterised as the success and effi cacy of normative 
claims (in sections 3.2 and 3.5 in Part I). 
I submit that, if we want to get clearer about the character of the legal norm prohibiting 
direct discrimination, we need to focus not on the mere fact of its institutionalisation but on 
another salient feature of it: that it has created a legal obligation not to discriminate.4 (The 
reasons for choosing this focus will become clearer below.) Obligations can be seen as a 
subcategory of the general model of normative guidance I have analysed in Part I of this 
article (in section 2). They do not simply communicate expectations with a view to making 
an impact on the addressee’s conduct. Obligations also involve establishing some normative 
ground for holding the addressees liable for acting on the relevant normative claims. 
Some might think that the term ‘obligation’ is not the best conceptual focus for us 
here. In our example, some form of obligation (most plausibly a moral obligation) not to 
discriminate seems to have been there in the fi rst place. The normative force of the legal 
obligation may be seen as derived from that ‘underlying’ obligation.5 But it does not mean 
that little has changed in terms of obligations with legal institutionalisation. The legal 
obligation is generated by a kind of explicit decision to make direct discrimination 
prohibited that is quite alien to the character of the relevant moral obligation. No one can 
claim that she has made it a moral obligation not to discriminate (the way the legislators in 
Westminster can about the corresponding legal obligation). The legal obligation here was 
purposefully created to generate specifi c normative ties between persons. 
This point is vital to my analysis. It is underlined by the fact that the creation of legal 
obligations in Equality Act 2010 (just like in any other statute) follows a characteristic 
pattern. Statutory obligations are imposed on the addressees unilaterally and regardless of 
their specifi c consent. The conditions of success for normative claims that purport to create 
3 See Equality Act 2010, ss. 113–126.
4 The choice of terminology is not accidental here. The concept of ‘obligation’ (as opposed to 
‘duty’) captures the relational aspect of normative ties: obligations are specifi c normative relations 
between parties. Cf. MacCormick, N.: Institutions of Law. Oxford, 2008, 109–115. It fi ts the way I 
have conceptualised direct normativity in Part I (subsection 2.3). 
5 This may be an implication of the view (held by some legal theorists) that only morality can 
obligate. See e.g. Hurd, H. M.: Interpreting Authorities. In: Marmor, A. (ed.): Law and Interpretation: 
Essays in Legal Philosophy. Oxford, 1995, 425.  
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obligations in this way invite a series of complex questions on how the law gains normative 
competence to obligate with unilateral acts. The interpretive data about legal obligations 
provide us with a conceptual focus for this inquiry. Someone must be a (practical) authority 
to be able to impose obligations on others by unilateral acts.6 (For example lawyers in 
Britain know that a statute like Equality Act 2010 could only come from the UK Parliament 
in Westminster.) What we are after is not simply normative guidance by institutions but 
normative guidance by authoritative institutions.
Understanding the kind of authority manifested in legal obligations is pretty much the 
key to clarifying the distinctive normativity of law.7 And there is an important clue about it 
in the interpretive data. The law is not the only authority that guides the addressees.8 The 
parent, the teacher, the spiritual leader and many others also have the capacity to impose 
obligations on certain addressees. It is an ever-present possibility that the addressee faces 
confl icting claims by different authorities. Following a certain course of action may be 
stipulated as an obligation by one authority but explicitly forbidden by another.9 It is 
revealing about the normative claims of law if we clarify how legal authorities are related to 
other authorities. And the available interpretive data suggest that the law addresses the 
possibility of confl icts by claiming a status of ‘primacy’ or ‘superiority’ over other 
normative practices.10 Legal institutions lay claim to determining the limits of the normative 
competence for rival authorities.11 
It does not mean that the directives of other authorities must always give way to law. It 
does happen that the law opens up ‘normative space’ for obligations from other sources by 
limiting its own normative clout. But the point is that, in such situations, the law purports to 
limit itself. It is the legal authorities that lay claim to determining the weight of rival 
normative claims in areas where they have normative clout.12 
6 See Bódig, M.: Jogelmélet és gyakorlati fi lozófi a. Miskolc, 2004, chapters 7 and 35.
7 This obviously invites questions on how my analysis is related to the concept of ‘authoritative 
reasons.’ For the two classical accounts of the concept, see Raz, J.: Practical Reason and Norms. 2nd 
ed., Princeton, N. J.,1990, 58–59; Hart, H. L. A.: Essays on Bentham. Oxford, 1982, 253–255. But I 
will not address that issue here. It is mainly because the compatibility of my account with the Razian 
idea of ‘exclusionary reasons’ (see Practical Reason and Norms pp. 40–45) would require a detailed 
analysis that I cannot provide here. I hope that I can make sense of the idea of institutionalised 
authority within the terminological framework I have at my disposal.  
8 Cf. Raz, J.: Between Authority and Interpretation. Oxford, 2009, 143. 
9 An example could be the regulation of abortion. In many countries, professional rules require 
gynaecologists to perform abortions during their training, which is, of course, forbidden by the 
Catholic Church. For a Catholic gynaecologist, this can generate a clash of normative claims with 
very uncomfortable implications.
10 Cf. Finnis, J.: Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford, 1982, 148. Llewellyn, K. N.: The 
Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method. Yale Law Journal, 49 
(1940), 1355–1400, 1367. In a similar context, Neil Walker characterises the authority claims of law 
as ‘magisterial’. See his ‘Out of Place and Out of Time: Law’s Fading Coordinates.’ Edinburgh Law 
Review, 14 (2010), 13–46, 31–32. 
11 The fact that this is an interpretive claim has special signifi cance here. The claim to ‘primacy’ 
I talk about may refl ect the way ideas of sovereignty took shape after the destructive religious confl icts 
of early modernity in Europe. Neil Walker argues that domestic law is losing its ‘magisterial’ character 
under the conditions of globalisation. See ibid. 44. 
12 UK equality legislation provides instructive examples for this. It regulates a whole series of 
exemptions from obligations under the Act, and most of them are designed to accommodate the 
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This claim of (normative) priority for legal authorities is even better refl ected in the 
interpretive data we get from the most characteristic manifestation of legal justifi cation: the 
legal dispute (as formalised in judicial procedures). One must think of legal procedures that 
revolve around the liability of particular persons, and in which the authoritative decision 
about liability emerges from a formalised practical debate between the parties. One of the 
characteristic features of such procedures is that the law pervasively determines the scope 
of the practical justifi cation the parties can resort to.13 It determines, in many ways, what 
reasons are relevant for imposing liability on the parties, and what reasons can be 
constitutive of the decision–clearly manifesting the claim of normative superiority by the 
law. If we live under the normative clout of law, we face the prospect of fi nding ourselves 
in situations where important practical judgments on our behaviour are determined in this 
way. 
1.2. Institutional normativity
After these preliminary remarks, we are better positioned to subject the normativity of law 
to a slightly more detailed analysis. The idea that guides our investigation is that, when 
written into law, the normative claim condemning direct discrimination has become 
institutionalised in a particular way: it was turned into an authoritative directive. The 
process of legal institutionalisation was driven by the fact that the normative claim was 
‘appropriated’ by particular authorities. 
First, I would like to have a cursory look at how the fact of institutionalisation alters 
the way normative guidance works. (Later, I will try to fi gure out why it is necessary that 
authority claims drive the process of institutionalisation.) It seems that our best starting 
point for this is the observation that there is a fundamental instability built into the idea 
normative guidance (as depicted in my analysis). I have claimed in Part I (subsection 3.2), 
in order to be capable of normative guidance, a normative claim must be successful, and 
that a normative claim is successful if it changes the conditions of justifi ability for the 
addressee’s conduct. What we have to realise is that these characteristics leave normative 
guidance uncertain in a number of obvious respects. They do not provide a reliable way to 
tell whether a normative claim is successful in relation to each (targeted) addressee. The 
exact impact of the normative claim on the conditions of justifi ability is also uncertain. And 
we have no secure way of ascertaining whether the addressee has managed to justify her 
actions in light of the relevant normative claim. All these issues can become a matter of 
normative claims of other authoritative entities–like churches (see e.g. Equality Act 2010 s. 29). But 
the point is that such exemptions must be provided for explicitly. Without it, the law trumps other 
normative claims. This aspect of the normativity of law was brought into sharp focus recently by the 
‘Jewish Free School’ case in the UK. See Regina (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2010] 2 A.C. 728. 
The UK Supreme Court ruled in the case that a boy who was not admitted to the pertinent school 
suffered ethnic discrimination (under Race Relations Act 1976). The Law Lords themselves were 
somewhat reluctant to trump the religious authority in this case but the relevant law very simply did 
not leave them a choice. See e.g. Baroness Hale’s complaints (at §§ 69–70) about the rigidity of the 
law when it comes to allowing for justifi ed departures.   
13 Cf. Fuller, L. L.: The Forms and Limits of Adjudication. Harvard Law Review, 92 (1978), 
353–409, 369.
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controversy and drawn-out dispute. And these are exactly the uncertainties that plague our 
moral discourses.14 
There is a feature of normative guidance that makes it pretty much inevitable that such 
uncertainties arise. The justifi catory force of normative claims is inherently linked to the 
discourses in which the reasons constituting them are formed and made intelligible. They 
are bound to have limited impact on the behaviour of those who are not committed 
participants of the pertinent moral discourses. (As I have indicated in subsection 3.6 of Part 
I, this was pretty much the case with the norm condemning discrimination: it had limited 
impact on those not committed to a liberal moral-political discourse.)
We should also add that uncertainty is not the only source of instability built into the 
idea of normative guidance. Even if we do not get stuck with debates about the success of 
our normative claims, there is no systematic guarantee that they will be aligned with the 
prudential reasons of the addressees. They may be overridden by preferences that one has 
stronger motivations to act upon. 
Quite obviously, these are practical diffi culties that affect the conditions of both the 
success and the effi cacy of normative claims. But the defi ciencies in terms of effi cacy may 
seem particularly problematic. They conspire to make it diffi cult to organise a consistent 
social practice around mere moral (and political) claims. 
Institutionalisation addresses these problems, and promises to tackle the instability of 
normative guidance. The way I read the interpretive data about the characteristic legal 
institutions (like courts or law enforcement agencies), the hope that legal institutions make 
normative claims more practicable derives mainly from three of their conceptual 
‘ingredients’. The fi rst is the constitution of institutional roles that make certain participants 
personally responsible for maintaining or enforcing normative claims. They become 
‘offi cials’ who are specifi cally incentivised to facilitate compliance with the relevant 
normative claims (e.g. by pay and career prospects). The second conceptual ingredient is 
the construction of procedures in which assessing the conduct of the addressees in light of 
legal norms takes centre stage. In those procedures, the scope of the practical justifi cation 
the addressees can resort to becomes closely tied to the relevant institutional norms.15 The 
third ingredient is that institutions rely on organised power. Institutions have human and 
other resources at their disposal that they can mobilise to add practical weight to normative 
claims. 
This may sound like claiming that institutionalisation is all about added pressure on 
the addressees to comply. If one demands the legal institutionalisation of a norm prohibiting 
direct discrimination, she looks like striving to force upon others a normative constraint that 
they are reluctant to subscribe to (or comply with). Adding practical weight to the norms 
allows for neutralising the impact of controversies on compliance. Of course, it would be 
diffi cult to deny that this is an inevitable consequence of institutionalisation. But it is 
equally important to see that the real political attraction of legal institutionalisation lies in 
something else. Institutions have the potential to develop a largely uniform practice in 
which the conduct of all the addressees is consistently assessed in light of the same 
14 Admittedly, these considerations refer back to Hart’s analysis about the defi ciencies of 
normative guidance through ‘primary rules’ only. See Hart, H. L. A.: The Concept of Law. 2nd ed., 
Oxford, 1994, 92–94. But I believe those considerations are contextualised better if they are related to 
the issue of institutionalising normativity. 
15 I believe that this is the analytically most important manifestation of the authority of law. 
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normative claims. Where moral and political controversies are pervasive features of public 
life, institutional norms offer the only chance to have an extensive body of common rules 
that may give a normative identity to a community. If one believes that we need a common 
rule that prohibits direct discrimination, it needs to be a legal one.
1.3. The effi cacy of law
We need to be a bit clearer on how institutionalisation can bring about drastic improvement 
in effi cacy. The challenge that requires a response is not that successful normative claims 
can completely lack effi cacy without institutional backup. (A successful normative claim is 
always effi cacious to an extent.16) The challenge is that most normative claims, purely on 
the strength of the reasons that make them successful, can attain only limited effi cacy. The 
effi cacy of successful normative claims is too dependent on the fi t with the moral outlooks 
and the given prudential reasons of the addressees. Systematic and enduring improvements 
in effi cacy can only be achieved through mobilising the action-guiding capacity of 
institutions.   
In Part I (subsection 3.5), I have characterised the ability of normative claims to 
generate compliance in terms of three types of reasons: ‘benefi t’, ‘response’ and ‘moral’. 
‘Institutional normativity’ can be construed as being built around the possibility of 
motivating people along the lines of these reasons. It does not mean that all of these reasons 
must play a role whenever someone complies with a directive. What it means is that, in 
terms of the effi cacy of normative claims, a variety of reasons are at the law’s disposal, 
giving it fl exibility to adjust to the dynamics of social relations and individual attitudes.  
1.4. The success of the normative claims of law
In light of what we already know about institutional normativity, it seems reasonable to 
think that it has limited capacity to add to the success of normative claims. No doubt, there 
is considerable moral attraction to having a common normative framework that has clearly 
defi ned boundaries patrolled by specialised institutions.17 But that attraction is limited to 
normative claims that are already successful: where the challenge lies in controversies 
about their exact scope or exact applications, and extending their normative scope to a 
broader cohort of addressees. In the fact of institutionalisation, there is nothing that would 
be capable of turning a wholly unsuccessful normative claim into a successful one.  
There is a feature of the relevant interpretive data that point to this very conclusion. 
What has been said about the success of normative claims may have reminded some of my 
readers of the way the concept of validity is deployed in institutional settings.18 Legal 
validity may look like the specifi cation of the conditions of success for legal norms. But it 
is not really the case. The very possibility of procedures like constitutional review (and the 
intelligibility of civil disobedience) indicates that meeting the institutional criteria of 
16 If a normative claim is successful, there must be agents (by defi nition) who accept the 
justifying force of the underlying reasons, and there must be agents who fi nd it important not to 
subvert the expectations manifested in them. These people are very much likely to comply.
17 This attraction may be strong for those who believe that one of the primary functions of law 
is to provide solutions to coordination problems. See e.g. Postema, G. J.: Coordination and Convention 
at the Foundations of Law. Journal of Legal Studies, 11 (1982), 165–203. Finnis, J.: Law as Co-
ordination. Ratio Juris, 2 (1989), 97–104.
18 See Bódig: Jogelmélet és gyakorlati fi lozófi a. op. cit. ch. 37.
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validity can fail to produce successful normative claims. Legal institutions can happen to 
enforce a norm that is widely acknowledged to be lacking the support of a proper 
background justifi cation. Validity is not really an institutional refl ection of the conditions of 
success–it is more like an institutional substitute for such conditions. Legal validity is one 
of the features of institutional normativity that help overcome the uncertainty over the scope 
of application for legal norms. It has more to do with effi cacy than success. 
In light of all this, it is not a surprise that legal institutions tend not to claim normative 
clout over the addressees simply on the basis of the organised power they wield, or by 
pointing to formal criteria of validity. They invariably build associations with legitimating 
discourses that link up the law with values like democratic credentials, public order and the 
common good. And, more importantly, they claim that there is good authority underlying 
the norms of law.19 (We can say that the criteria of validity are designed to trace the 
manifestation of the relevant authority–never to constitute it.) 
In other words, if the norm prohibiting direct discrimination is made ‘more successful’ 
in the process of institutionalisation, it derives largely from the fact that authorities have 
thrown their weight behind it. I have argued in Part I (in subsection 3.2) that two types of 
reasons must come together to constitute a successful normative claim: reasons providing a 
justifi catory background to the substantive normative qualifi cation and reasons underlying 
the competence of those who make the normative claim. Institutionalisation in itself has 
little or no impact on the fi rst aspect of the conditions of success but it profoundly 
reconstitutes the second one. In our example, the most important change that the normative 
claim condemning direct discrimination underwent lies in the fact that it came to represent 
the expectations of a (political) authority with comprehensive normative competence over 
the conduct of its addressees. 
This may give the impression that, in the process of writing a normative claim into 
law, we witness two developments that are largely independent of each other: (1) the 
appropriation of the normative claim by an authority, and (2) mobilising institutional power 
to bolster instrumental reasons for compliance. One is concerned mainly with conditions of 
success, and the other with effi cacy. But that is inaccurate. The connection is more intimate 
between the authoritative and institutional aspect of legal normativity. The improvements in 
effi cacy I have outlined cannot be realised without turning normative claims into obligations. 
We know that non-legal normative claims often provide considerable normative guidance 
without constituting obligations: by giving advice or encouraging people to aspire for 
excellence. The case of institutional normativity is different. Interpretive data suggest that 
all forms of effi cient enforcement of legal norms works primarily through imposing liability 
on the addressees. Without this, offi cials would not be able to single out addressees who are 
to be subjected to legal procedures, and much of the impact on the instrumental reasons of 
the addressees would be lost. The gains in effi cacy institutions promise can be realised only 
through establishing a system of obligations. And one needs to be an authority to guide 
action by setting up a system of obligations.
19 That is why it is typical that legislative pronouncements come with a standard formula 
pointing to the authority manifested in the fact of enactment. In Equality Act 2010 (just like in any 
other UK statute), the formula is the following: ‘Be it enacted by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, 
by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present 
Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows…’ (Italics are mine.)
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This is refl ected in the fact that the form of legal institutionalisation tends to be 
structured by the character of the authority they manifest. Institutionalisation is driven by 
the assumption that the authority is justifi ed in using power to bolster its directives. The 
power that institutions rely on is tailored to the authority they exercise. The use of organised 
power (to put pressure on the addressees to comply) only qualifi es as an act of law if it is 
authenticated by authoritative pronouncements. 
1.5. Obligations and moral reasons
One of the crucial implications of these considerations is that institutional normativity has a 
distinctive justifi catory dimension. And we have reached the point in the analysis where we 
can get a bit clearer about this dimension. The point I want to highlight here is that 
prudential reasons alone simply cannot give rise to obligations. It can happen that we have 
strong prudential reasons to do something. It can also happen that we have prudential 
reasons to act upon an obligation. But having prudential reasons can never be enough to 
generate obligations. This consideration can be linked up with a conceptual point I have 
made in Part I (subsection 3.5). When we have an obligation to do something, it sets a 
normative standard (a ‘liability’) for us that remains, to a considerable degree, insensitive to 
the shifts in our perceived interests. Obligations have a characteristic non-instrumental 
element. Although obligations are often created with a view to achieving personal aims (it 
may be in my interest to enter a contract), they are not invalidated simply by a change in 
one’s perceived interests. Normally, they are to be respected even when they become 
burdensome. By contrast, changes in our personal aims and perceived interests immediately 
reconfi gure our instrumental reasons. Prudential reasons do not establish normative bonds 
that become (even partly) independent of one’s perceived interests. 
There are legal theorists (Hart among them) who argue that legal obligations are sui 
generis obligations whose character is conceptually different to that of moral obligations20–
legal obligations can be generated in ways that moral reasons have nothing to do with. Of 
course, it is undeniable that legal obligations differ from moral obligations in important 
respects. (I have even emphasised this above.) However, it seems fundamentally mistaken 
(at least within the methodological framework that determines my perspective) to think 
that legal obligations can be generated without the justifi catory background of moral 
reasons. It fl ies in the face of important interpretive data. In our legal practices, normative 
bonds that are detached from the perceived interests of the addressees are quite common. 
We cannot challenge the normative claim implied in a legal obligation by pointing out that 
we have no interest in acting upon it. Normally, when the issue of liability is raised in a 
legal procedure, it is irrelevant whether the addressee had prudential reasons to comply 
with the legal requirement. I cannot see how one can account for this feature of law if one 
denies the constitutive role of moral reasons in generating legal normativity.21 It seems 
20 See e.g. Hart: Essays on Bentham. op. cit. 145–161.
21 I note that this view presupposes the rejection of the legal positivist idea of ‘social 
normativity.’ See e.g. Hart: The Concept of Law. op. cit. 254–259. See also Coleman, J.: The Practice 
of Principle. Oxford, 2001, 69–71. Advocates of this strategy deny that moral reasons have a 
necessary place in the explanation of legal normativity. For my take on the issue, see my Jogelmélet 
és gyakorlati fi lozófi a. op. cit. ch. 4.
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more plausible that the law can create obligations only with the justifi catory background 
of moral reasons.22 
1.6. The problem of sanctions
I believe that we are likely to arrive at the same insight about the constitutive role of moral 
reasons if we concentrate on the way response-reasons fi gure in the normative guidance 
provided by law. I have mentioned in Part I (in subsection 3.3) that reasons associated with 
coercion (i.e. reasons generated by legal sanctions) can be part of providing normative 
guidance–but only under specifi c conditions. That is, coercion must be imposed and applied 
by agents who are in a particular normative position. If we ask about the parameters of the 
position that qualifi es someone to impose sanctions on others, we are unlikely to fi nd 
convincing answers without pointing normative bonds that are independent of the perceived 
interests of the addressees.
It may be surprising that my account makes an explicit reference to the idea of 
‘sanction’ so late in the analysis. Nothing seems to be more obvious that legal norms 
typically stipulate sanctions. But I deliberately held back the concept. Sanctions are not part 
of the basic structure of normative claims–not even legal ones. Sanctions generate what Raz 
helpfully terms ‘auxiliary reasons’23–they give extra practical weight to normative claims. 
This assumes that successful normative claims always have some normative force without 
sanctions. In fact, sanctions must be built on successful normative claims that have 
signifi cant action-guiding capacity independently of them. If there is no successful 
normative claim that the sanction can be attached to, its imposition constitutes an act of 
mere coercion. 
This is a claim that fi nds solid support in interpretive data. It is characteristic of the 
law to resort to sanctions but their application can only be legally appropriate when it is 
justifi ed by pointing to a breach of legal obligations. (This is literally the only way in which 
legal sanctions can be deployed in a constitutional democracy.) Legal obligations are 
conceptual preconditions to legal sanctions. Hence, it must be possible to clarify the 
conceptual character of legal obligations without making reference to sanctions. I have tried 
to demonstrate in this analysis that such a clarifi cation is indeed possible. And, of course, 
the key to getting the conceptual relationship between obligations and sanctions right is 
distinguishing between the conditions of the success and the effi cacy of normative claims 
(that I developed in subsections 3.2 and 3.4 of Part I). Sanctions have a role (often an 
indispensable role) in making successful normative claims more effi cacious–but they have 
not much to do with the circumstances that make normative claims successful.  
22 Of course, on the basis of the limited analysis I have provided, it is impossible to clarify what 
would count as an adequate moral justifi cation necessary to constitute a legal obligation. In fact, I do 
not think that there is a general answer to this question. It may be that, in most cases, what is required 
is no more than what Kenneth Himma has suggested: the law must be ‘the type of thing that is 
minimally respectable from a moral point of view’ to be able to give rise to obligations. See Himma, 
K. E.: The Ties that Bind: An Analysis of the Concept of Obligation. p. 32. Available at SSRN (http://
ssrn.com/abstract=924106).
23 For the concept of ‘auxiliary reasons’, see Raz: Practical Reason and Norms. op. cit. 34–35.
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1.7. False normativity
The picture that is emerging in this section suggests that institutional normativity is mainly 
about closing motivational gaps–channelling behaviour by infl uencing motivations and 
bringing it within the range of justifi able actions. In this sense, the art of creating and 
administering law is based on the ability to identify and mobilise the motivations that 
produce actions that meet reason-based expectations.24 At the same time, as we have seen, 
institutional normativity cannot be all about effi cacy–generating compliance. Institutional 
normativity must ‘feed on’ normative claims that are at least partly successful in the fi rst 
place. This follows mainly from the fact that institutions cannot provide effi cient normative 
guidance without imposing obligations on the addressees. Due to the conceptual character 
of obligations, support from moral reasons is bound to become a condition of success for 
institutionalised normative claims. 
Of course, this is an insight with far-reaching and multifarious implications for the 
normativity of law. This is the insight that brings into focus the vexed issue of the moral 
legitimacy of law and its impact on the normative force of law. Pursuing this issue requires 
us to develop a better understanding of how the available interpretive data associate the law 
with political ideals and values that profoundly shape the perception of law by the 
participants of the practice. Of course, this is an issue that I cannot treat adequately here. As 
I have indicated in Part I (section 1), it is not because I believe that interpretive legal theory 
should leave such issues to normative political theory. Interpretive analysis can and should 
extend to political values that are constitutive of legitimating discourses systematically 
linked to the legal practice. The reason for stopping here is that this is a methodological 
implication that I chose to set aside in this particular investigation.
However, there is one aspect to the interplay between legal normativity and the 
conditions of success for normative claims that I can point out here. And I must point it out 
here to complete the present analysis. I have emphasised above that legal institutions have 
their ways of addressing the conditions of success for their normative claims. Most 
importantly, they are constituted as authoritative institutions that purport to have the 
normative competence to make their addressees liable for complying with the law. But we 
should not forget that the conditions of success are twofold: there must be reasons providing 
a substantive justifi catory background to the pertinent normative claim, as well as reasons 
that underlie the claimants’ competence. What we have to realise is that, although the 
authority claims of legal institutions directly touch upon the competence dimension of 
normative claims, they can have little impact on the substantive justifi catory background. 
Appropriation by authority does not make a normative claim substantively more justifi ed. 
Legal institutionalisation in itself provides no cure for the possible defi ciencies of the 
substantive justifi cation for the normative claims. And the inevitable consequence of this is 
that institutionalisation opens up the possibility that the law produces what we might call 
‘false normativity’: generating compliance with (partly) unsuccessful normative claims. 
Moreover, it is reasonable to think that false normativity is not just a possibility. Considering 
that the reliance on legal normativity is necessitated partly by the fact of moral and political 
24 As the reasons which provide the background justifi cation for the expectations must be 
reasons for the addressees to constitute normative guidance, I believe that Raz’s ‘service conception 
of authority’ is fundamentally plausible. See e.g. Raz, J.: Ethics in the Public Domain. Oxford, 1994, 
214. 
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disagreement,25 it would be unrealistic to think that it is not one of the systematic features 
of law that people are, at least occasionally, forced to act in ways that are not justifi ed from 
their perspective.26 False normativity is a characteristic feature of the legal mechanisms I 
refl ect on. 
I believe that it is the issue of false normativity that ultimately determines the character 
of the problem of the moral legitimacy of law. It is by refl ecting on this issue that helps us 
capture the exact sense in which legal normativity inevitably has a dark side, and embracing 
institutional normativity in a community comes with a particular moral burden. It also 
indicates that, by stating that the law has the capacity for genuine normative guidance, one 
does not imply that the law is free of moral tension and even oppression. What it implies 
instead is that the inevitable defi ciencies of its moral justifi ability have a tendency to erode 
the ability of law to provide normative guidance. The law cannot maintain its ability to 
provide normative guidance without building functional links with moral and political 
discourses that have the potential to ‘legitimize’ and to generate momentum for institutional 
changes that address the challenges to legitimacy. Managing issues of legitimacy is part of 
the everyday life of legal systems. 
2. Conclusion
I have dedicated this two-part analysis to the exploration of the character of interpretive 
theorising about law. It started with outlining three methodological points: interpretivism 
makes general theories of law problematic, interpretive analysis needs to extend beyond the 
traditional issues of conceptual legal theory, and it renders theories ‘doubly’ contingent. I 
have set aside the fi rst two points to be able to deal with the third one in some detail.
I have claimed that interpretive theories are forced to accept the possibility of 
developing a number of potentially equally plausible accounts of the conceptual 
characteristics of law. My own analysis has put together one account of the normativity of 
law from a narrow set of interpretive data and a few conceptual devices fl oating around in 
contemporary mainstream legal theory. I have characterised normative guidance in terms of 
the impact practical reasons have on intentions in discursively constituted social interactions. 
In this framework, the claim that the law is normative means that it guides behaviour by 
making an impact on the practical deliberations of its addressees. I put the concept of 
normative claims at the centre of my analysis of normativity, and characterised them as 
reason-based expectations on the addressees’ conduct. The internal structure of normative 
claims were analysed in terms of the conditions of success and effi cacy for normative 
claims. The success of normative claims has two dimensions: their substantive background 
justifi cation and the competence of those who make the pertinent normative claims. The 
effi cacy of normative claims (that is, their ability to generate compliance) was broken down 
to the ability to provide three types of reasons: ‘moral’, ‘benefi t’ and ‘response’ reasons. 
The distinctive normativity of law was characterised against the background of the 
idea of institutional normativity. I have argued that the type of guidance the law provides 
brings obligations into focus. Legal obligations presuppose an authority structure without 
25 Cf. MacCormick: op. cit. 245. For a more substantial analysis, see Waldron, J.: Law and 
Disagreement. Oxford, 1999.
26 One can claim that false normativity has infected the ‘Jewish Free School’ case that I have 
mentioned above. See supra note 11.  
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which the normative claims of law cannot be successful. The conceptual character of 
obligations was analysed in terms of both instrumental and non-instrumental reasons, and it 
pointed to a conceptual link between the law’s ability to impose obligations and its moral 
legitimacy.
Admittedly, my account of the distinctive normativity of law is under-determined, and 
relies extensively on defi nitional fi at. The substantive account of normativity I provide does 
not offer a general paradigm for legal theory: it is just one contingent example for the way 
normative theorising works. But I believe it has considerable explanatory force, and it 
promises some progress in integrating doctrinal perspectives on law with contemporary 
mainstream legal theory.
